



University of Antwerp  
Operations Research Group

ANT/OR

# Horizontal co-operation in a clustered distribution environment

*exchanging zones for increased efficiency*


Christof Defryn    Kenneth Sörensen  
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ORBEL 30    28-29th January 2016 – Louvain-la-neuve

*Research supported by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO - Ph.D. fellowship) and the Interuniversity Attraction Poles (IAP) Programme initiated by the Belgian Science Policy Office (COMEX project)*





# The concept of client clustering




## Optimisation context

- ▶ Large-scale VRP
- ▶ Short-term planning
- ▶ Dynamic



# The concept of **client clustering**




## Optimisation context

- ▶ Large-scale VRP
- ▶ Short-term planning
- ▶ Dynamic

*How to deal with such a  
nasty beast?*



# The concept of **client clustering**




**Divide distribution area  
in **zones****

- ▶ One vehicle serves multiple zones
- ▶ *Sorting* is decoupled from *routing*
- ▶ Reduction of problem complexity

Janssens et al. (2015)



# The clustered vehicle routing problem




## Strong cluster constraints

- ▶ Serve all clients with a given fleet of vehicles
- ▶ Visit clients of each zone sequentially in the same path



# The clustered vehicle routing problem




## Strong cluster constraints

- ▶ Serve all clients with a given fleet of vehicles
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A vehicle trip is represented by a sequence of zones



# The clustered vehicle routing problem




## Strong cluster constraints

- ▶ Serve all clients with a given fleet of vehicles
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A vehicle trip is represented by a sequence of zones



## Introducing a collaborative environment



*In a world with multiple courier companies...*

- ▶ ... setting up a horizontal collaboration might be beneficial
- ▶ A single courier company then becomes a **partner** in the **coalition**





# Solving a collaborative routing problem

## Operational plan + fair cost allocation mechanism

- ▶ **Method of aggregation** (solve problem at coalition level)
  - ▶ All resources are shared (*vehicles, warehouse capacity, . . .*)
  - ▶ All clients and their orders can be exchanged among partner



- ▶ The size of the problem grows significantly, together with its **complexity**
- ▶ Coalition efficiency  $\stackrel{?}{=} \text{Individual partner efficiency}$



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# A two-level solution approach

## Master problem


- ▶ Coalition efficiency
- ▶ **Suggesting** *good moves*
  - ▶ Exchange/interaction between partners  
→ **collaboration**
  - ▶ Most profitable for the coalition (*e.g. reduction of total logistic cost*)

## Slave problems

- ▶ Individual partner efficiency
- ▶ Can be different for each partner
- ▶ **Evaluating** the move
  - ▶ *"At what cost will I accept the move?"*
  - ▶ *"What am I willing to pay for this move?"*




## Hands-on example



- **Initial Solution:**  
Stand-alone scenario




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
## Hands-on example



- ▶ **Initial Solution:**  
Stand-alone scenario
- ▶ **Master:**  
Cluster with highest marginal cost = E




## Hands-on example



- ▶ **Initial Solution:**  
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- ▶ **Master:**  
Cluster with highest marginal cost = E
- ▶ **Slave:**  
**Red** is willing to pay



## Hands-on example




- ▶ **Initial Solution:**  
Stand-alone scenario
- ▶ **Master:**  
Cluster with highest marginal cost = E
- ▶ **Slave:**  
**Red** is willing to pay  
**Blue** wants to receive money






# Hands-on example



- ▶ **Initial Solution:**  
Stand-alone scenario
- ▶ **Master:**  
Cluster with highest marginal cost = E
- ▶ **Slave:**  
**Red** is willing to pay  
**Blue** wants to receive money
- ▶ **Master:**  
If match found
  - ▶ Execute move
  - ▶ Money transfer



## Iterate until ...



### Remarks:

- ▶ What if no match
  - ▶ Master suggests another move
- ▶ Stopping criterion
  - ▶ No more feasible moves available



# The result

- ▶ A solution approach for the Collaborative Clustered Vehicle Routing Problem



# The result

- ▶ A solution approach for the Collaborative Clustered Vehicle Routing Problem
  - ▶ **Is the solution good?**
    - At least as good as the stand-alone scenario.



- ▶ A solution approach for the **Collaborative Clustered Vehicle Routing Problem**
  - ▶ **Is the solution good?**
    - At least as good as the stand-alone scenario.

- ▶ **Coalition efficiency:**

- **Yes!**

- Decrease in total logistic cost for the coalition, ensured by the suggestions from the Master problem.

- ▶ **Individual partner efficiency:**

- **Yes!**

- Before executing a move, it is evaluated by the involved partners.



## The result

- ▶ A solution approach for the Collaborative Clustered Vehicle Routing Problem
- ▶ A **cost allocation mechanism** is included implicitly in the solution procedure



# The result

- ▶ A solution approach for the Collaborative Clustered Vehicle Routing Problem
- ▶ A **cost allocation mechanism** is included implicitly in the solution procedure
- ▶ **How good (fair) is this cost allocation?**
  - ▶ No game theoretical concepts or properties can be proven
  - ▶ Based on what the individual partners **want**
  - ▶ We know that all partners **agree**



## And for the future?

- ▶ Run tests and simulations for different instances and scenarios
  - ▶ Try to understand the behaviour and impact of the different building blocks in our model
- ▶ Try these ideas and framework on other routing problems that include horizontal co-operation
- ▶ Talk about these ideas, and look for feedback
- ▶ and ...





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# DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF METAHEURISTICS

Antwerp | 17-18 March | [www.eume2016.be](http://www.eume2016.be)



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